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Abstract: 
The present essay argues that Bergson’s account of the comic can only be fully 
appreciated when read in conjunction with his later metaphysical exposition of the élan vital in 
Creative Evolution and then by the account of fabulation that Bergson only elaborates fully three 
decades later in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. The more substantive account of the 
élan vital ultimately shows that, in Laughter, Bergson misses his own point: laughter does not 
simply serve as a means for correcting human behavior but is rather the élan vital’s vital 
summons, the demand of life itself, that human beings challenge their obligations, question their 
societal forms, and thereby create new and, for Bergson, more ideal forms of life and 
community. 
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“Drama offers nature her revenge on society” (Bergson L76/R122). 
In his Introduction to Sociology, Theodor Adorno states that “it can happen that we catch sight of 
the essential—and may even do so today—in relation to phenomena that seem to lack any such 
significance” (Adorno 2000, 19). Henri Bergson’s 1900 Le Rire (Laughter) is a case in point. 
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Despite its brevity and relative neglect in Bergson scholarship, the concerns of this little book 
extend to much more profound—more essential—things than its title indicates.1  
Bergson’s account of the laughable is often wrongly reduced to Laughter’s most famous 
phrase, namely that we laugh whenever we find “the mechanical is encrusted [plaqué] on the 
living” (Doyle 2002, 153-174; Doyle 2016, 83-87).2 With this formulation, Bergson invites us to 
imagine a fishmonger who can only throw an object as if it were a fish, or a particle physicist 
who But Bergson’s essay has at least three concerns not adequately encapsulated by this phrase: 
it aims to answer the behavioral and social question of what provokes laughter, of what the 
laughable is; it aims to situate this answer within Bergson’s developing metaphysical position; 
 
The author would like to thank Keith Ansell-Pearson for the invitation to write this essay, Anna Street for her 
helpful comments, and Lydia Moland for her tireless and brilliant editing work that made it substantially better in 
every way. Errors and incidences of humor that remain are the author’s own. This essay is dedicated to Rich Doyle 
whose work inspired it and nourished it. With gratitude and thanks. 
 
1 Several recent and classical accounts of Bergson’s work, such as Mullarkey’s Bergson & Philosophy (2000), 
Lawlor’s The Challenge of Bergsonism (2003), Deleuze’s Le bergsonisme (2008), Ansell-Pearson’s Henri Bergson: 
An Introduction (2011), omit consideration of Laughter entirely. He is mentioned only in passing in Morreall’s 
humorously self-serving entry in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Philosophy of Humor.” Of the 
various accounts of Bergson’s philosophy, only Jankélévitch’s Henri Bergson (2015), originally published in 1931, 
contains significant references to Laughter. It should also be noted that Freud’s Jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious (1990), originally published in 1905, also addresses Bergson’s claims. 
2 The fourth section of the first chapter of Laughter states that “[t]he attitudes, gestures, and movements of the 
human body are laughable in exact proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine” (L21/R22-23). (This 
passage is italicized in the French and printed in small caps in the English translation.)  
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and it aims to provide something of an account of art generally.3 This ambition helps to explain 
both one of the more comical aspects of Bergson’s book – that it doesn’t deal at all with the 
actual act of laughter – but it also helps explain one of the most enigmatic and important 
passages in the book: the crossed carrefours that organizes and concludes the final section of the 
opening chapter (L24ff/R29ff). There Bergson acknowledges the difficulty of offering a 
definition of the comic. Instead of a single definition, he suggests an image: 
 [W]e might think of an immense forested avenue, with crosses or carrefours that mark it 
at intervals: at each carrefour we will walk round the crossing, we will venture out to 
explore the paths that open out before us, after which we will go back to our original 
direction. 
This image shows that the claim that the comical is “the mechanical encrusted on the living” is 
not the conclusion of Bergson’s analysis of the comic phenomenon but merely the result of the 
exploration of one of these stipes – these branching paths – that emerge as he pursues the 
patibulum of the meaning of the comic.is to argue can only be in with yet other branching paths 
in his later career: first, 1907, then withcontrary to one of his primary claims,  such a joke on its 
 
3 The concern with the nature of art generally is presented quite early in the first chapter (L10/R2). However, in the 
first part of the third and final chapter of the essay – the chapter that the rest of the book has been explicitly building 
towards – Bergson asks, “What is the object of art?” (L72/R115) and he answers, a few pages later, in a brief 
statement that virtually presents his entire metaphysics, that “[a]rt is certainly only a more direct vision of reality” 
(L75/R120). 
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greatest achievement?5 As the metaphysical exposition of Bergson’s Creative Evolution (1907) 
will make clear, laughter 
 Bergson’s procedure in Laughter is not argumentative.  It is rather as if he invites 
the reader to join him in an intellectual stroll that discovers its topic as it proceeds.  This essay 
will attempt to signpost the paths Bergson ultimately follows, then give a sense of the greater 
philosophical journey of which they were ultimately a part. 
1. The Argument of Le Rire  
Chapter One of Le Rire, the first stipe of the carrefours, is sociological. It is, after all, the 
sociologist who investigates not only “the comic in general” but who surveys “the comic of 
forms and expressions” of a society. Bergson accordingly gathers his metaphysical tools from a 
series of sociological observations whose results, after further refinement, he will proceed to 
deploy in a fully formed theory of art as well as social life.7 Bergson’s rhetoric here is vital for 
following not only the argument of Laughter but also seeing the way that the argument develops 
later.  Bergson orients himself and his investigation by the metaphysical crossing, the 
philosophical patibulum, of the carrefours – it drives his investigation and, at the carrefours, it 
orients and structures his sociological strolls. The preceding four parts of Chapter One have 
developed the various stipes, the radiating bars, of the cross – the crux – of Bergson’s argument. 
 
7 Prusak’s “reinterpretation” of Bergson’s book too strongly argues that the theory of élan vital “organizes” 
Laughter, but he is absolutely correct to note that Bergson’s metaphysics, which is still far from completely 
formulated in 1900, has a distorting effect on several of Bergson’s claims. (Prusak, 2004)  
7 Prusak’s “reinterpretation” of Bergson’s book too strongly argues that the theory of élan vital “organizes” 
Laughter, but he is absolutely correct to note that Bergson’s metaphysics, which is still far from completely 
formulated in 1900, has a distorting effect on several of Bergson’s claims. (Prusak, 2004)  
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His observations – for instance, the sociological stipes into which he sojourns – conjoined to the 
other stipes provide only an initial orientation, not what is all too easily confused with Bergson’s 
“definition” of comedy. 
 Having catalogued these observations—which I will not detail here—Bergson turns his 
attention to how they have enriched his initial claim that the comical is “the mechanical 
encrusted on the living”.8 His first conclusion is that the comic concerns only the human 
(L10/R2). When we laugh at a hat blowing away from its owner,  seems to be purposely, 
consciously evading capture: it seems to be acting like a human. Secondly, the comic is 
accompanied by an “absence of feeling” (L10/R3) appeals exclusively to “pure intelligence” 
(L11/R4, translation altered). laughter requires an echo: that is, it requires a community 
(L11/R4). From these characteristics, Bergson draws a metaphysical conclusion: society requires 
of each of its members “a constantly alert attention that discerns the outlines of the present 
situation, together with a certain elasticity of mind and body to enable us to adapt ourselves in 
consequence. Tension and elasticity are two forces, mutually complementary, which life brings 
into play” (L16/R14). However, a further qualification is needed: “is not satisfied with simply 
living, it insists on living well” (L16/R14)fears individuals that content themselves with merely 
living according to established norms and habits. To borrow William Connolly’s term, the 
laughable would arise when the teleodynamic activity of a society—its flexible evolution of 
 
8 Bergson’s book is filled with examples of the various comic phenomena he discusses. Some are familiar and recur 
often – such as scenes from Don Quixote and The Misanthrope – others are taken from the vaudeville or comic stage 
of Bergson’s own time, while still others are seemingly perennially funny (a person slipping on a banana peel, 
sneezing at the most poignant line while delivering a eulogy, etc.). 
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norms—is placed in abeyance.9 The comparably much shorter sections three and four of Chapter 
One add just two more things that prompt laughter: bodily rigidity (which reverses the properly 
human dominance of form over matter) and repetitive bodily actions that, by fulfilling the three 
characteristics and so also exemplifying the mechanical encrusted on the living, cause the human 
actor to resemble a mechanism rather than a living being.10 These two sections become important 
when Bergson turns to the relation between art and life. 
 In Section Five of the first chapter, Bergson returns to the philosophical patibulum from 
his sojourns in the stipes and, rather than nailing comedy to a simple Latin cross, this multiple 
crucifixion, as though on the more ornate Gothic cross’ several stipes, allows him to explore 
three other observations of the comic effect. Although it eludes any definition, Bergson states 
that there is a “formula” of the comic effect that “exists well enough in a certain sense, but its 
development does not follow a straightforward course” (L24/R28). The roulette that its 
development does follow is again an early indication of Bergson’s conclusion not only in 
Laughter but in the development of the theory of élan vital in Creative Evolution and Two 
 
9 In his article, “Species Evolution and Cultural Freedom,” Connolly offers the neologism “teleodynamic,” or 
“teleodynamism,” as the name for an alternative to three prevalent forms of teleology: genocentrism, divine 
intentionalism, and natural teleology. Connolly’s teleodynamism “projects differential degrees of agency into 
multiple, heterogeneous, and interacting systems, and it identifies periodic moments of creativity within and 
between evolving organisms.” He concludes that teleodynamism “does not altogether deny teleology; rather, it 
insinuates differing degrees of creativity into teleodynamic processes.” In other words, such processes are goal-
oriented but undetermined as to the goal that they must pursue, creating new goals as evolution proceeds (Connolly 
2014, 444). Keith Ansell-Pearson’s Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life 
(2001) pursues a similar reading of Bergson. 
10 As Bergson puts it elsewhere: “The truth is that a really living life should never repeat itself” (L23/R26). 
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Sources of Morality and Religion. The development of Bergson’s account of comedy is neither 
rigid nor repetitive and is, in fact, “a game, a game that imitates life” (L37/R52) If, as Heraclitus 
is said to have remarked, “[l]ife is a child at play, moving pieces in a game” (Graham 178/179; 
HCT 154 [F109]), then the comic fancy chooses roulette. 
 The second chapter of Laughter takes up what Bergson calls the comic element in 
situations and in words. Its method is to take children’s games and amusements and to discover 
how they develop or grow into a more mature form of the comic – but this is to be done to test 
the law that has already been discovered: “Any arrangement of acts and events is comic which 
gives us, in a single combination, the illusion of life and the distinct impression of a mechanical 
arrangement” (L37/R53). Bergson’s three examples of such “children’s games” are the jack-in-
the-box, the dancing-jack (a puppet controlled by strings), and the snow-ball, by which Bergson 
means “an effect which grows by arithmetical progression, so that the cause, insignificant at the 
outset, culminates by a necessary evolution in a result as important as it is unexpected” 
(L43/R62). Each of these examples is carried further using corresponding situations from 
drama.11 “But,” Bergson asks at the conclusion of these three analyses, “why is it we laugh at 
this mechanical arrangement?” (L45/R66). The answer, which Bergson regards as merely a 
different formulation of the previous answer, is that “the rigid mechanism which we occasionally 
detect, as a foreign body, in the living continuity of human affairs is of peculiar interest to us as 
being a kind of absentmindedness on the part of life” (L45/R66; emphasis added to “life”). 
Despite his claim that this is just the same definition repeated in a different form even Bergson 
 
11 Bergson assumed, at the outset of Chapter Two, “that the stage is both a magnified and a simplified view of life” 
and that “comedy is capable of furnishing us with more information than real life on this particular part of our 
subject” (L37/R51). 
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seems to realize his argument is starting to shift here. He notes first that “the “methods” of the 
second chapter “have been entirely empirical” (L46/R67), but he then turns to what he calls “a 
full and methodical theory” (L46/R67) which will involve discovering, via the particular 
magnification provided by drama, the “essential characteristics [that] life, when viewed from 
without, seems to contrast with mere mechanism” (L46/R67).  
 The turn to life itself, after the tripartite characterization of the comic as human, 
concerned solely with the intelligence, and inherently social, is bewildering for the reader unless 
one recalls that this book is by an author who, in his earlier works, showed a marked interest not 
only in contemporary psychological research but also in the philosophical issue of the worldly 
embodiment of the mind. In Time and Free Will (Essai sur les données immédiates de la 
conscience) Bergson sought to show, among other things, the reality of the “free act” through the 
elaboration of his capital concept of duration.12 Matter and Memory (Matière et Mémoire) makes 
this worldly embodiment even clearer, stating in what Bergson calls his “theory of pure 
perception” (Bergson 1896, MM65/MM67) – a theory that has not yet had memory added back 
into the activity of perception – that “[p]erception, in its pure state, is, then, in very truth, a part 
of things” (Bergson 1896, MM64/MM66-67). The laughable, the comic and the laughter that it 
provokes must also be features of life peculiar to the form of the human. 
 “Life,” Bergson asserts, “presents itself to us as evolution in time and complexity in 
space” (Bergson 1900, L46/R67). The difference between these aspects yields three 
 
12 See especially Bergson’s account of the way that the associationist conception of the mind employs a defective 
understanding of the free human individual (Bergson 1889, 155-163). Frédéric Worms’ summary of the Essai in his 
“Brève introduction aux autres livres de Bergson” at the end of his Introduction à Matière et Mémoire de Bergson is 
also helpful in this regard (Worms 1997, 292-295). 
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characteristics “which distinguish the living from the merely mechanical” (Bergson 1900, 
L48/R68) and to each of these characteristics can be opposed its counterpart, yielding the 
following table which would depict, according to Bergson, a corresponding and complete list of 
“the methods of light comedy, [for which] no others are possible” (Bergson 1900, L46/R68): 
Outward characteristics of the living 
A continual change of aspect 
The irreversibility of the order of phenomena 
The individuality of a perfectly self-contained series 
 
Outward characteristics of the mechanical 
 
Repetition 
 
Inversion 
Reciprocal Interference of Series 
 
For each characteristic of the mechanical, Bergson provides several examples drawn from comic 
theater. Repetition is a series of incidents that recur in different circumstances; inversion is 
obtained by the reversal of roles (Bergson highlights the trope of “the robber robbed”); while the 
reciprocal interference of series is perhaps illustrated best by Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night or The 
Comedy of Errors in which the device of twins allows for the characters to have a reasonable but 
incorrect understanding of their actions while the audience is able to see the  situation revealed at DR
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the end of the play.13 In each case, Bergson concludes, the objective of the laughable is “to 
obtain what we have called a mechanization of life” (L52/R77). 
 The other section of Chapter Two is concerned with laughable effects expressed in or 
obtained by language. It is a relatively minor part of Bergson’s argument in which he merely 
demonstrates how language, too, is laughable when it adheres to his three-part criteria. He then 
turns to the comic in character, which, as the subject of Bergson’s third and final chapter, is the 
culmination of the argument of the entire book 
 Human beings are essentially social beings for Bergson, and the laughable can therefore 
only be found where a member of a community displays an “absent-mindedness” toward both 
her fellow citizens and to the norms of the community that she has learned in order to become its 
member (L65-66/R102-103). A philosopher of normative political theory, banging out journal 
articles in her ivory tower, entirely unaware of any real political situation, would be such an 
absent-minded individual. The function of laughter is both to chastise such “callousness to social 
life” (L66/R102) but also to return the individual to society by waking her from her dream 
(L66/R103). It is for this reason that Bergson regards “[t]he analysis of comic characters … as 
the most important part of our task” (L65/R101).  
 But this “most important task” quickly leads to others. Doccupies only half of the first 
section of Chapter Three before giving way to a second problem: the relation and meaning of art 
to human life. In this discussion, and in contradistinction to so many caricatures of Bergson’s 
theory, laughter is certainly reasserted as a social corrective but one that, while perhaps 
instantiated by individuals, indicates a natural, social, and unconscious action on the part of 
 
13 Bergson’s own examples are the comparably less well-known Tartarin on the Alps (1885) by Alphonse Daudet 
(1840-1897) as well as works by Eugène Marin Labiche (1815-1888). 
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nature and society that follows a logic imperceptible to consciousness: “It indicates a slight 
revolt on the surface of social life” (L94/R152).  
 This revolt occurs when society attempts “to reprove the absentmindedness of one of our 
fellows and to wake him out of his dream” (L66/R103).  human society has its own customs and 
habits to which newcomers – children and immigrants alike – are introduced and immediately 
expected to follow.  someone ignores or otherwise violates these norms they exhibit—in 
Bergson’s apt phrase—“a growing callousness [le raidissement] to social life” (L66/R102). Like 
a character in a comedy, the laughable member of society is distinguished not by particular faults 
or acts of wickedness, but simply by “rigidity.” After a detour through the techniques by which 
an unsociable fault can be made laughable, Bergson returns to the central issue of character and 
concludes that “inattention is here equivalent to what we have called unsociability” (L71/R112). 
14 
 Here Bergson raise the question of the relation between comedy and the other arts. “Life 
is action” and drama is action rendered artfully (L73/R115). This life of action is concerned with 
utility, not creativity. Perception self-knowledge oriented toward capabilities and the fulfillment 
of needs; even our everyday language is utilitarian, ignoring the individuality of things whenever 
possible and instead seeing things as genera. In sum, Bergson concludes, “we live in a zone 
 
14 Bergson’s analysis of the techniques by which a comic character can be rendered yields three characteristics. The 
first is that the character must be unsociable (again, though, not immoral); the spectator’s attention must be drawn to 
the unintentional and automatic gestures of the character (rather than to the character’s actions); and, finally, the 
character is marked by automatism, not merely in the sense of behaving like a machine but in making “involuntary 
gestures” and/or in uttering “unconscious remarks” (L69-71/R111). The combination of the two – “systematic 
absentmindedness” – is the most laughable spectacle of all, and its exemplar is Don Quixote. 
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midway between things and ourselves, externally to things, externally also ourselves” 
(L74/R118). The aim of art is precisely “to brush aside the utilitarian symbols, the conventional 
and socially accepted generalities … in order to bring us face to face with reality itself” 
(L75/R120). Artists are human beings, members of society, who are able to detach themselves, in 
part, from the utilitarian character of life and thereby create artifacts that reveal the ultimate 
natural necessity that human beings must live together in society and also live by the rules 
instituted for the order of that society. 
 Having identified the distinguishing features of comedic characters, and after offering a 
surprisingly expansive account of the relations between comedy, art, and life, Bergson ends the 
first part of the final chapter by returning “to the double conclusion we reached in the course of 
our investigations” (L80/R130). The first part of the conclusion is that “a person is never 
ridiculous except through some mental attribute resembling absent-mindedness” (L80/R130). 
This attribute is now further likened to a “parasite,” and the function of laughter would be to 
excise a foreign body. Moreover, the comical aims to depict character types that are as 
widespread in a society as possible, thereby achieving a maximum curative effect. These 
distinctive characteristics form the second part of Bergson’s conclusion. Finally, however, 
Bergson adds a remarkable statement on the relation between comedy, art, and life: “So we were 
probably right in saying comedy lies midway between art and life. It is not disinterested as 
genuine art is. By organizing laughter, comedy accepts social life as a natural environment, it 
even obeys an impulse of social life. And in this respect it turns its back upon art, which is a 
breaking away from society and a return to pure nature” (L81/R131). Here again, Bergson’s 
nascent metaphysics intrudes—productively—on his analysis. As he will explain in Creative 
Evolution, life aims to create forms and, in human beings, it has created forms that are 
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themselves capable of creating forms. Reading this back into Laughter, Bergson can be seen 
ascribing the comic art—and the laughter it produces—to human beings so that they might have 
an implement to shatter the inevitable calcification of their naturally creative social forms. 
  return to the discussion of comic character : vanity.16 Neither virtue nor vice, this 
omnipresent human quality is “an admiration of ourselves based on the admiration we think we 
are inspiring in others” (L82/R132). Although he forgoes a detailed analysis of vanity, Bergson 
clearly indicates that it is a necessarily social quality—it is “based on” what we think we are 
“inspiring in others” —and he also makes clear its close bond with laughter: “laughter 
perform[s], with mathematical regularity one of its main functions—that of bringing back to 
complete self-consciousness a certain self-admiration which is almost automatic, and thus 
obtaining the greatest possible sociability of characters” (L82/R133). One of the main functions 
of laughter seems then to be the laughable—because it occurs with “mathematical regularity” —
rejoining of social life with natural life. 
  in our everyday dealings with them are generally reduced to types, and those types often 
correspond to the individual’s profession. Thus, if the precipitate of the laughable is vanity, its 
most common and effective forms will be the vanity that assumes the form of “professional 
callousness (l’endurcissement)” (L84/R136). Bergson exemplifies this character by pointing to 
judges who only speak legalese and act solely according to the dictates of the legal profession. 
Doctors that do the same, or religious officials—Tartuffe being the obvious example—are 
likewise too rigid to be lifelike and therefore laughable. In each case, the vain character has and 
acts on a self-estimation that is not based on others, making them laughable. Although these 
examples provide helpful and readily-available evidence for Bergson’s argument, he pushes the 
 
16 See footnote 14. 
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point further. In addition to—and perhaps lurking beneath—every instance of professional 
callousness is what Bergson calls a “professional logic,” i.e. certain ways of reasoning that are 
customary in particular professional circles, but awkward or maladapted for general public life 
(L85/R138). An investigation of this “professional logic,” as well as its cognates and outgrowths, 
will form the core of argument of the final two sections of Laughter. 
 As short as they are, and as far as they stray from the central thesis of Laughter, the final 
two sections of the last chapter are among the most important and rich in the book. Having 
introduced the idea that there is a kind of logic to the comic—that “particular” or “professional” 
logic that manifests as a professional callousness—Bergson, in section four, takes up directly the 
claim by the artist and critic Théophile Gautier that “the comic in its extreme form is the logic of 
the absurd” (L85/R139). 17 Bergson immediately notes, however, that there is an obvious error in 
Gautier’s theory insofar as there are absurdities that are not comic at all; his theory mistakes a 
cause for an effect. However, Gautier’s theory is not discarded entirely. Rather, having 
previously determined what it is that produces the comic effect, Bergson sets about rectifying 
Gautier’s claim (L86/R139). 
 The correction is accomplished by an analysis of that epitome of the comic, Don Quixote, 
who “furnishes us with the general type of comic absurdity” (L87/R142). On the one hand, an 
ordinary person who perceives “something that bears a faint resemblance to a large motionless 
body with revolving arms” would probably identify this thing as a windmill through simple 
common sense: “Common sense represents the endeavor of a mind continually adapting itself 
 
17 Pierre Jules Théophile Gautier (1811-1872) was a widely-esteemed critic and playwright. He is one of the few 
critics whose theory of comedy Bergson singles out in Laughter. Despite the widespread notoriety of Gautier’s 
claim about the comic, the source of the quote is unclear. 
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anew and changing ideas when it changes objects. It is the mobility of the intelligence 
conforming exactly to the mobility of things. It is the moving continuity of our attention to life” 
(L86/R140). Common sense is the faculty that navigates the everyday middle ground of the 
utilitarian, the space between the extremes of art and life. Quixote’s error is logical, but it also 
represents “a very special inversion of common sense” (L87/R141). Where common sense, in its 
healthy operation, is a continuous adaptation between the mind and the world, the “special 
inversion” in Quixote’s case is that his character has acquired a particular rigidity; his is “[a] 
stubborn spirit [that] ends by adjusting things to its own way of thinking, instead of 
accommodating its thoughts to things” (L87/R142). The latter part of Bergson’s remark is an 
infelicitous one because it obscures the work that the plastic and utilitarian mind does in coming 
to have ideas of the objects that it encounters. Bergson seems to intend a distinction between 
Quixote’s idiomatic rigidity and the supple adaptability of everyday common sense. He discards 
the various sorts of rigidity that characterize the morbidity of various kinds of mental illness—
these arouse pity and Bergson has already concluded that the laughable bears no trace of the 
emotional. What he is left with, surprisingly, is the logic of dreams: “The behavior of the 
intellect in a dream is exactly what we have just been describing. The mind, enamored of itself, 
now seeks in the outer world nothing more than a pretext for realizing its imagination” 
(L88/R143). And, Bergson continues, “if the logic of the comic is the logic of dreams, we may 
expect to discover in the logic of the laughable all the peculiarities of dream logic” (L88/R143). 
The hypothetical is significant because Bergson will assume the veracity of his antecedent in the 
subsequent discussion. 
 Given that forms of the laughable become laughable when they are recognizable as a 
cognate of one of the more familiar forms, Bergson now argues that any “play of ideas” becomes 
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laughable when it is recognized as resembling what he calls “the play of dreamland (les jeux du 
rêve)” (L88/R143). This is a complicated rhetorical maneuver. What allows it is perhaps best 
expressed in an essay that Bergson published in 1908, one year after Creative Evolution, entitled 
“Memory of the Present and False-Recognition.” There, speaking of psychic facts generally, 
Bergson writes that the abnormal or morbid psychic fact 
was already being manufactured while the conditions were normal; but it was prevented 
from emerging, when about to appear, by one of those continually active inhibitory 
mechanisms which secure attention to life. Were each of these organs to work by itself, 
there would result a host of useless or untoward effects, liable to disturb the functioning 
of the others and so upset that adjustable equilibrium by which our adaptation to the 
environment is continually maintained. But a work of elimination, of correction, of 
bringing back to the point, is constantly going on, and it is precisely this work which 
secures a healthy mind. (Bergson 2002, 142) 
 
Although not mentioned, one of the ways of correcting and retrieving ill minds is, of course, 
laughter. Inverting the traditional question from “why is the ill mind so?” to “why isn’t the 
healthy mind so?” Bergson here establishes the basis for a novel interpretation of psychic life 
generally that helps to explain the convoluted path of the concluding pages of Laughter. In his 
1908 essay he continues “I have applied that method [of explaining why certain psychical 
phenomena are not found in the normally healthy mind] to the study of dreams  . . . .  They are 
supposed to be facts of a special order  . . . which is the dream-life” (Bergson 2002, 142-3). Our 
utilitarian social existence is a limitation, a diminishment of the fullness of our dream-life and its 
bewildering array of sensible and intelligible effects, and laughter—as Bergson argues in 1900—
is the social remedy for any member of the community who strays too far into “the play of 
dreamland.”18 
 
18 In the fourth section of Laughter, Bergson flatly states that “Comic absurdity is that of dreams” (L88/R142; the 
entire phrase is italicized in the French). It is difficult – if not impossible – to correlate Bergson’s arguments in 1900 
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 Since “given one form of the laughable, other forms that are lacking in the same comic 
essence become laughable from their outward resemblance to the first,” any relaxation of our 
utilitarian social disposition may lead us into “a certain general relaxation of the rules of 
reasoning” (L88/R143-4). In other words, the relaxation of reason may lead us to become 
laughable. More generally, “[t]he reasonings at which we laugh are those we know to be false, 
but which we might accept as true were we to hear them in a dream” (L88/R144). Bergson 
identifies four such reasonings that have the appearance of dream-reasonings: witticisms, in 
which a play on words overtakes (or undercuts) the play of ideas; “comic obsessions,” in which a 
common element repeatedly appears in all manner of contexts; “a particular crescendo” that 
terminates a string of ever-more ridiculous situations; and, finally, the “reciprocal interference of 
two series” that is possible in dreams because, in dreams, the dreamer “is himself, and not 
himself” (L88-91/R143-7). This analysis which, on the one hand, seems to accord with what 
Bergson had previously argued in fact leads to a new insight that Bergson only develops in a few 
brief lines of the final section of the entire book. As Bergson writes in the opening line of that 
section, “the comic seems to show itself in a form somewhat different from the one we lately 
attributed to it” (L91/R147-8). It is no longer simply the “callousness” of a “plaque” that adheres 
to the living, nor is it simply a “mechanical encrustation,” —although, to be sure, it appears in 
 
with those he makes in 1908. To do so would, at a minimum, require an investigation that ranged far afield of the 
present argument. What can be —and has been—shown is that Bergson’s discussion of dreams in 1900 and 1908 
both emphasize the same central point: that our everyday utilitarian existence – common sense – is a “constriction” 
of the much more extensive life of dreams. Additionally, reading backwards from the 1908 essay to Laughter, the 
later essay is a valuable clarification of the final pages of the former. 
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these guises—it now appears as the self-criticism of life itself effected by humanity, its avatar 
and greatest achievement. 
 Any reader of the final section of Laughter must find it remarkable that Bergson’s 
“theory” of comedy is so often reduced to “something mechanical encrusted on the living” 
(L24/R29). It remains true that laughter “is first and foremost a means of correction” 
(L91/R148), but it is equally true, as the analysis of Chapter Three has shown, that the corrective 
aspect of laughter “is not what we are immediately struck by in our first impression of the 
laughable” (L91/R148). Our first impression of the laughable is not contempt or hatred, but 
“sympathy.” The person at whom we laugh is first treated “as a playmate” (L92/R144). As 
Bergson notes, the examples he has given immediately preceding have shown that there is “a 
movement of relaxation” in laughter that must be analyzed and accounted for” (L92/R142). The 
work of common sense is utilitarian; it “demands a continuous effort of intellectual tension” by 
which the mind forces its ideas to remain within the bounds of the sensible (L92/R149). But this 
work is just that and, like any form of work, it requires occasional suspension. Such a suspension 
is not a pure disavowal of real existence but is rather, like the logic of dreams, the continuation 
of the creation of ideas only now broken away from the restrictions of the sensible. “So,” 
Bergson writes, “comic absurdity gives us from the outset the impression of playing with ideas. 
Our first impulse is to join in the game” (L92/R149). Common sense is work—it is a tensity—
and the laughable character appears first of all—and perhaps only for a moment—as someone 
who has set this work aside. The result—“our first impulse,” Bergson stresses—is an implicit 
solicitation to join in their play (L92/R149-150). 
 Two points remain. The first is that the relaxation of laughter and the behavior of the 
laughable are unsustainable. The prior analysis of laughter has not been discarded, it has only 
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been simplified: laughter is the social disapprobation inflicted on someone who has wandered 
too far from the social life of common sense. The second part, closely bound to the first, is that 
laughter is human only insofar as it is vital. Or, better, it is vitality, the élan vital, that laughs 
through humanity. Laughter is not infallibly inspired by kindness, justice, or any other 
conventional normative consideration. To be an act with normative force, “it would have to 
proceed from an act of reflection” (L93/R150). However, Bergson has just finished 
demonstrating that the initial sympathy provoked by the laughable arrives prior to common sense 
and reflection. “In this sense, laughter cannot be absolutely just” (L93/R151). Thus Bergson 
concludes by returning to the naturalness of laughter, to its vitality. By laughing at and thereby 
humiliating its members, a society betters itself perhaps not normatively but certainly creatively; 
in Bergson’s words, “nature has utilized evil with a view to good” (L93/R152). In order to 
develop, grow, expand and pursue teleodynamic ends, society must play at its most central forms 
of life, its most cherished and constitutive beliefs – and this play will appear inevitably laughable 
to conservative common sense. In the concluding lines of Laughter—lines that already anticipate 
the metaphysics of Creative Evolution—Bergson reminds the reader that “[w]e have seen that 
the more society improves, the more plastic is the adaptability it obtains from its members; while 
the greater the tendency towards increasing stability below, the more does it force to the surface 
the disturbing elements inseparable from so vast a bulk; and thus laughter performs a useful 
function by emphasizing the form of their significant undulations” (L93-4/R152). In other words, 
the laughable brings the non-vital to light and allows it to be eliminated from the social body. 
The result—and this is the most important conclusion of Bergson’s essay—is a decrease in the 
laughable but an increase in a society’s ability to play with its constituent and normative 
forms—to experiment with new forms of life—without abandoning common sense. Laughter is 
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the sign of a “slight revolt on the surface of social life” (L94/R152) that betokens the work of 
stabilizing and making less disturbing all of the organs that make up human society precisely by 
valorizing their different teleodynamisms. 
 
2. Laughter and Life 
 Bergson’s Laughter has led two strangely different lives: famous for being a detailed 
philosophical consideration of the laughable, and famous for being ignored or minimized as a 
part of Bergson’s corpus.19 Bergson never returns to the book, takes up its arguments or, if he 
does, he does so implicitly and without citation or mention of comedy and laughter. In fact, 
whether Bergson himself realized it or not, the discussion of comedy—especially in the closing 
pages of Laughter—adds an important dimension both to the metaphysics developed most fully 
in Creative Evolution and to the study of human norms and values in the much later The Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion. As Prusak has correctly argued, Bergson’s discussion of the 
laughable is inextricable from his discussion of norms.20 Furthermore, such norms need not be 
envisioned as fixed termini but can rather be conceptualized in William Connolly’s Nietzschean 
formulation of the dynamically vital processes that constitute the open cosmos of creative 
 
19 The editors of Bergson’s Key Writings provide a note to their Introduction explaining that “[t]he one work we 
have excluded from both the readings and our introductory discussion is Laughter, because, being primarily a 
popularist piece of work, its place must be peripheral in an analysis of his academic philosophy” (Ansell-Pearson 
and Mullarkey 2002, 376). Finally, Bergson’s last publication, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion also 
makes no reference to Laughter. 
20 Prusak, op. cit., 384. Prusak is here following the earlier work of Helmuth Plessner. 
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evolution, as teleodynamic.21 Work such as Prusak’s, Connolly’s, Lombardini’s, and others 
enable a new appreciation of Bergson’s full account of comedy and its role in his larger political 
project. Such an endeavor is beyond the scope of the present essay, but some traces of the 
laughable can be found in both Creative Evolution and The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion that might serve as seeds for future research.22 
 The avowed purpose of Creative Evolution is to explicate the élan vital, discovered in 
Chapter One, which shows that “[l]ife does not proceed by the association and addition of 
elements, but by dissociation and division” (EC89/CE90). The élan vital does not follow any 
kind of teleological development but rather develops according to the problems that impose 
themselves as obstacles to its unified expression. This is the inception of the three great 
classifications – plant, animal, and human – the last of which is marked by two different 
faculties: intelligence and instinct.23 Bergson offers several definitions of these terms but the 
most comprehensive is as follows: “instinct perfected is a faculty of using and even of 
constructing organized instruments; intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and using 
 
21 Connolly, 444. An interesting essay that uses Connolly’s work to analyze the political role of the laughable in 
Aristotle is John Lombardini’s “Civic Laughter: Aristotle and the Political Virtue of Humor.” Lombardini writes 
that “the positive value of laughter lies in its ability to serve as a medium for critical engagement with friends, 
enemies, and strangers with whom we disagree” (216, also see the discussion on 219-222). 
22 Additional examples of such work can be found in Ford (2004, 2016), Lefebvre (2008, 2013). 
23 “The impetus of life [l’elan de vie], of which we are speaking, consists in a need of creation” (Bergson 1998, 
EC251/CE252). Bergson’s subsequent discussion elaborates the way that the impetus of life is forced to reckon with 
matter as an obstacle to its creativity. The discussion culminates in Bergson’s declaration that “Everywhere but in 
man, consciousness has had to come to a stand; in man alone it has kept on its way. Man, then, continues the vital 
movement indefinitely, although he does not draw along with him all that life carries in itself” (EC266/CE266). 
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unorganized instruments” (EC140/CE141). It is intuition— “instinct that has become 
disinterested, self-conscious” (EC176/CE178) —that yields consciousness whose expansion 
thereby yields “endlessly created creation” (EC178/CE179). Accordingly, humanity, possessed 
of consciousness – which is, as the most expansive faculty for creation, “the motive principle of 
evolution” — “comes to occupy a privileged place in nature” (EC182/CE183). Humanity is the 
creation whose consciousness allows it, a created form, to invent ever new forms. 24 The chain of 
evolution, of division that pursues ever-different forms of wholeness in its teleodynamic process, 
is broken by the consciousness of man. “With man, consciousness breaks the chain. In man, and 
in man alone, it sets itself free” (EC264/CE264). Constantly threatened by the ease of 
“automatism,” the free and fully conscious human being is the “term” and the “end” of evolution 
(EC265/CE265). In its everyday utilitarian activity the very freedom of instinct that constitutes 
consciousness – a blend of intellect and intuition – threatens to sweep humanity into a vacuous 
dreamworld. Laughter is the vitality of the intellect that returns it to the teleodynamic task of real 
creation. 
 Twenty-five years after Creative Evolution, Bergson published his last major work, The 
Two Sources of Morality and Religion (Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion).25 A 
 
24 Bergson is somewhat unclear as to whether non-human animals possess intelligence. He states that intelligence 
and instinct “never entirely separate from each other” (EC142/CE143) but that different organisms possess one or 
the other to a greater degree. They “represent two divergent solutions, equally fitting, of one and the same problem” 
(EC143/CE144). 
25 Bergson’s fame was at its peak during the second decade of the twentieth century and he traveled widely, both to 
lecture on his philosophy and to further the interests of the French government during the First World War. He 
retired from the Collège de France in 1920 and then went into near-seclusion after 1925 due to crippling arthritis. 
The publication of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion was therefore a major philosophical event. For an 
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steady contrast is drawn throughout the book between what Bergson calls “open” and “closed” 
societies and between these societies and the élan vital elaborated in his earlier work.26 In the 
final chapter of The Two Sources, Bergson states that the “closed society is that whose numbers 
hold together, caring nothing for the rest of humanity, on the alert for attack or defense, bound, 
in fact, to a perpetual readiness for battle. Such is human society fresh from the hands of nature” 
(TSMR266/DSMR283). The open society, on the other hand, is a society which Bergson dreams 
of embracing all of humanity. It is “a dream dreamt, now and again, by chosen souls, it embodies 
on every occasion something of itself in creations, each of which … conquers difficulties 
hitherto unconquerable” (TSMR267/DSMR284). The difference between these two types of 
societies – in their mutual connection to Bergson’s metaphysics – is the particular type of 
“fabulation” that provides the basis for the belief system that holds them together.27 And Bergson 
emphasizes that they must be held; durable human communities require a particular kind of 
grounding fiction in order to keep the intelligence from driving their members apart, in order to 
constitute a common sense. “The truth is that intelligence would counsel egoism first” 
(TSMR122/DSMR126). With the ascendancy of intelligence in humanity, “religion is then a 
defensive reaction of nature against the dissolvent power of intelligence.” 
(TSMR122/DSMR127). As humanity develops, this “defensive reaction” assumes the more 
familiar social forms of laws and the norms of various social groups. 
 
account of the intellectual currents in which Bergson’s final book appeared – one largely dominated by 
phenomenology and Heidegger – see Kleinberg 2005. 
26 Bergson’s concepts would later be famously adopted by Karl Popper. 
27 The English translation of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion renders the French “fabulation” as the 
“myth-making function.” 
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 However, as Bergson has persistently argued across his oeuvre, the élan vital is a creative 
force that reaches its apex in humanity: the creation that is itself a power of creation. But it does 
not create with the intelligence, whose function is to preserve the creation that every human 
community already is. Instead, it is instinct, the sympathy that binds all human beings to each 
other, by which individuals give their allegiance, give themselves “to a society comprising all of 
humanity” (TSMR212/DSMR225). Bergson turns to a kind of mysticism in The Two Sources, to 
“dynamic religion,” one that prospects for ever-better and more inclusive forms of social life, of 
humanity. The vital tool for such prospecting is laughter. Its perpetual criticism of our tendencies 
to egoism, to self-absorption – in short, to vanity – remedies and valorizes the joint work of 
human communities. At the limit, vanity is abolished – precisely the condition for a society that 
comprises every human being. Human life was only ever a joke: the élan vital acting as a 
creative force that perpetually risks the complacent self-absorption of vanity in order for that 
same élan vital to perpetually goad its greatest achievement, humanity, toward the joyful and 
free creation of its own future. 
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